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MONGOLIAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
IN QUEST OF FRIENDS AND PARTNERS, NOT ALLIES
Alvin Magid and Richard W. Mansbach
For much of its history, Mongolia has been hostage to the realities of
political geography. China’s Qing dynasty, founded in 1644 by invading forest-
dwelling Manchus from north of the Great Wall, was able to gain control of tribal
(Inner and Outer) Mongolia by the end of the seventeenth century. With Qing’s
downfall in 1911, what was then Outer Mongolia declared its independence from
China. But hardly a decade had passed when independent Mongolia, reconsti-
tuted as a Marxist state, fell under the sway of the new Soviet Union: Marxist
Mongolia became the first Soviet satellite. All the while this was happening;
Inner Mongolia remained a part of the Chinese state, whether under Guomindang
or communist rule. More than two years before the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China, in October 1949, in the midst of the Chinese civil war, the
Chinese Communist Party created the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
one of several such units in the People’s Republic of China.
It should occasion no surprise that independent Mongolia, wedged be-
tween two giant neighbors and isolated from potential allies, with a vast land
area, a population of only 2.4 million, and a tiny army should be preoccupied
with the question of its future security. For centuries, Mongolia has been re-
garded by its neighbors, China and Russia, as an important buffer between
them. And owing to the military exploits of Genghis Khan and his successors
and the presence of ethnic Mongolians in northern China and eastern Russia,
Mongolia has also been the object of wary suspicion by those neighbors. These
are   elements   in both   the   communist-ruled   People’s Republic of China and
the Republic of China (Taiwan) ruled over by the Guomindang Party who, think-
ing imperially, still dream of reconstituting China as the Middle Kingdom, sur-
rounded by tributary states that once included inter alias the territories of present-
day Inner Mongolia and independent Mongolia.
In light of the aforementioned considerations, it is little wondered that
independent Mongolia might be attracted to a traditional balance-of-power ap-
proach to the question of how to provide for its national security: a weak,
vulnerable state searching about for allies who would help it be independent
and secure. But on close inspection, such an approach is seen to bear the
weight of a self-defeating paradox: were such allies available, in Chinese and
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Russian eyes Mongolia would seem far more dangerous than it presently is to
its two giant neighbors, rendering weak Mongolia even more vulnerable than it
is today to their predatory, possibly expansionist, designs.
In this article, we will argue that   a balance-of-power approach is largely
irrelevant to Mongolia’s security problem; that such an approach might even
imperil Mongolia; and that in an increasingly globalize world there may be far
more effective ways of enhancing Mongolia’s independence and national secu-
rity.
Mongolia and the Asian Balance of Power
Traditional balance-of-power theory, largely derived from the European
experience, teaches us that Mongolia is something of a power vacuum and that
each of its powerful neighbors, China and Russia, will be tempted to fill that
vacuum in order to prevent the other from doing so. In fact, in the case of
Mongolia the balance-of-power approach is neither theoretically valid nor prac-
tically useful.
Traditional balance-of-power theory predicates four important    assump-
tions about the nature of the international system: first, that there is a more or
less equal distributor of power among an optimal number of states (usually
five); second, that power is easily measurable; third, that allies are available for
balancing the power of any potential aggressor(s); and fourth, that states are
prepared to switch their alignments in order to confront any potential hege-
mony. In other words, in a balance-of-power system there are no permanent
friends or enemies, and ideology is limited to a consensus over maintaining the
system itself. Few of those conditions obtain in contemporary global politics,
none in the case of Mongolia.
Practical obstacles also stand in the way of achieving a viable balance of
power with regard to Mongolia. According to balance-of-power theory, the he-
gemonic ambitions of any actor or group of actors must be neutralized by
countervailing power. Such countervailing power can be mobilized either by
building up the military strength of the threatened state or by the formation of
alliances of expediency. Since Mongolia cannot hope to develop its military
power sufficiently to deter or defeat either of its neighbors, the first possibility
can be immediately dismissed. Mongolia’s hopeless military situation is seen in
these facts: China’s armed forces are larger than the population of Mongolia;
currently at a level of five thousand, Mongolia’s army can neither deter nor repel
an incursion or invasion by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
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Now let us consider whether there are potential allies to whom Mongolia
might turn in the event of a threat from either China or Russia. Put simply, there
are no such allies. Mongolia’s geographic isolation, its relative unimportance to
other states with significant military capabilities (e.g., the United States), and
the West’s growing unwillingness to incur large numbers of wartime casualties
suggest that for Mongolia a strategy based on seeking military allies is doomed
to fail. Today, as in the past, only Russia has the potential capability and interest’s
necessary to protect Mongolia from Chinese coercive bullying or military inva-
sion1, and only China is in a position to afford Mongolia similar protection
against Russia. Under these conditions, Mongolia may seek to be one of two in
a sphere of three, but the asymmetry in power between Mongolia and either of
its potential “protectors”, China or Russia, is so great that the result once again
would be to render Mongolia a dependent satellite.
Mongolians may also be tempted to seek to construct a semblance of
balance by playing off each of its two neighbors against the other. This would
be very dangerous for Mongolia. Efforts by a week, vulnerable state to play off
great powers against each other often leads to penetration by all such powers as
each great power seeks to shore up its position in the “pawn” by preempting its
rival great powers. Both China and Korea sought to use this tactic against the
Western imperialist powers and Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The result was to strengthen the hand of foreign imperialism in China
and Korea2.
The Changing Nature of Security and the Value of Weakness
Since it is well nigh impossible for Mongolia to assure its independence
by increasing its own power, we must consider whether the country’s very
weakness can be transformed into an asset. To Mongolians, China and Russia
loom like giants and constitute the alpha and omega of Mongolian security
concerns. By contrast, it is probable that Mongolia hardly appears on radar
screens in China or Russia (except as it relates to the Sino-Russian relation-
ship)3.
There are, however, actions and policies that Mongolia might initiate that
would bring the country the unwelcome attention of its two giant neighbors.
The most dangerous would be to take up the cause of Pan-Mongolians and play
the part of an Asian “Serbia” or “Piedmont”4. Chinese of all political and ideo-
logical stripes agree on the imperative of China’s unity. With the death of Deng
Xiaoping, many observers feared that China would fragment. Although there
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are few signs that the regime is eroding, a de facto division of the country based
on the growing autonomy of the freewheeling capitalist south may someday put
the issue of China’s unity to a crucial test. Only time will tell whether China can
pursue economic liberalization without an erosion of political control from the
center.
Even more dangerous from Han China’s perspective are secessionist move-
ments among the country’s minority nationalities living along the borders. Res-
tiveness is evident in Chinese Tibet and in Xinjiang Province with its large
Muslim population, much less so in Chinese Inner Mongolia. In Tibet and
Xinjiang, Beijing continues to crack down hard against all signs of unrest, par-
ticularly secessionist activity. While there has been some strain in the 1990s
between the Mongols and Han majority in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region, the province has continued to evince political quiescence under strong,
effective communist rule. How long this condition will obtain is a matter for
conjecture. Let it suffice to note that the political status quo has already been
challenged-in recent days, from abroad: on July 19, 1997, on the occasion of the
fiftieth anniversary of Inner Mongolia as an autonomous region in China, a
small group of Mongols demonstrated near the Chinese Embassy in Ulaanbaatar,
capital of Mongolia. Associated with a new Inner Mongolia People’s Party formed
in New York in March, the demonstrators demanded that Beijing halt the pro-
cess of cultural assimilation with the Han majority in Inner Mongolia; stop the
dumping of nuclear waste in Inner Mongolia; and rid the region of smog. They
also demanded that political prisoners in Inner Mongolia be freed and that
democracy be instituted there. The demonstrators said that their long-range
objectives were to end control by the Chinese Communist Party over Inner
Mongolia and to establish an independent country on its soil5.
An increasingly powerful and resourceful China can be expected to resist
all such challenges, probably successfully. The limits particularly of external
pressure on China over the matters of its domestic composition and its interna-
tional boundaries may be gleaned from the cases of Bosnia and East Timor,
respectively, in Balkan Europe and the Indonesian archipelago. Accordingly,
Mongolia must take great care not to allow political, possibly irredentist Pan-
Mongolians to develop on its soil. While Mongolia’s democratic constitution
does allow for the free expression of dissident views, including those favoring
independence for Inner Mongolia, and, in effect, the dismemberment of the
Chinese state, the government in Ulaan Baatar must carefully weigh that consid-
eration against the reality of China’s great sensitivity over the question of na-
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tional unity and territorial integrity. If groups such as the Inner Mongolia People’s
Party are left free to propagate their views and possibly organize an anti-Chi-
nese front in independent Mongolia, then China can be expected to react vigor-
ously, possibly even with military force, to suppress such a threat. If ever China
were to take that action, Mongolia would be faced with a serious threat to its
own sovereign independence and national security.
It should be emphasized that China’s rulers, communist or otherwise, will
work mightily to block secession for any one or combination of the country’s
minority nationalities. And if ever blows originating at home and/or abroad
prove powerful enough to cause China to fragment or break up as when major
parts of the old Chinese Empire split off in the first generation (1912-1928) after
the Qing downfall - then the remnants of power in China will strive to reconsti-
tute the old patrimony-as did the Bolshevik rulers of the new Soviet Union. ( By
1923, thirteen territories that had broken away from the old Tsarist Empire in the
chaos of World War I and the Russian civil war were brought under the Soviet
banner, often by force.) In sum, no exhortation or coercion, Islamic, Buddhist, or
secular, will induce China to let Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia gain a place in the
sun by secession and consequent sovereign statehood or irredentist unifica-
tion with ethnic cohorts in established sovereignties(e.g., with one or another of
the Muslim states born out of the Soviet collapse and with independent
Mongolia).
Yet another caveat should be observed by Mongolia as it strains to cope
with a powerful, possibly vengeful and covetous China on its southern border.
This one involves the issue of Tibet, which merits highlighting here. As with
Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, China will not let Tibet go. Even the Dalai Lama,
exiled head of the Tibetan Buddhist theocracy, seems finally to have come to the
realization that Tibet’s future place will be in a Chinese firmament. Perhaps that
is why, after a ten-year hiatus, in July 1993 the Tibetan leader sent an official
delegation to Beijing, led by his older brother, to restart talks with Chinese
officials-presumably about what the Dalai Lama has been campaigning for in
recent years: a quasi-federal associative status for Tibet based on cultural au-
tonomy short of independence. Thus far, the call for such a Tibetan entity within
the Chinese state has had ambivalent effects -drawing wide support internation-
ally, but falling on deaf ears in Beijing and creating deep fissures in the Tibetan
Diaspora.
It should be noted that even if the Dalai Lama’s proposal that Tibet be
granted a measure of self-governance short of independence ever does strike a
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responsive chord in Beijing and among a broad spectrum in the Tibetan Diaspora
and in Tibet itself, there would still be extraordinarily difficult obstacles to over-
come. These include delimiting the territory of  Tibet and specifying the limits of
cultural, spiritual, and political authority for a Tibetan theocratic entity endowed
with a quasi-federal associative status within the Chinese state. With regard to
the issue of territorial demarcation, there is no consensus between the Tibetan
exile community in Dharmsala, India, and the Chinese authorities. There is a
substantial Tibetan population in the Xizang(Tibetan) Autonomous Region in
western China and also in each of four Chinese provinces: Sichuan, Qinghai,
Gansu, and Yunnan. Three of the four provinces-Sichuan, Qinghai, and Yunnan-
border the Xizang Autonomous Region; Gansu has borders with the other three
provinces, but not with Xizang. Contiguous with each other, the five units con-
stitute a large part of mainland China. “Greater Tibet” comes close to bordering
Chinese Inner Mongolia and, by extension, its neighbor to the north, indepen-
dent Mongolia. Together with Muslim Xinjiang Province in northern China,
these territories form a wide arc extending from southwest China almost to China’s
northeast quadrant — posing a potential threat, as China has seen it from time
immemorial, to the vast Chinese state based on an ancient emporium.
Accordingly, the question of delimiting the Tibetan homeland continues
to be deeply divisive. The Chinese government holds that the Xizang Autono-
mous Region is Tibet; the Dalai Lama and his followers contend that Tibet
consists of all the Tibetan lands in the autonomous region and the four prov-
inces.
As if all of this were not complicated enough, the issue of Tibet is bedev-
iled also by the strong support the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles continue to
receive in the international community particularly in the U.S. Congress and the
film industry in Hollywood. In 1997, the Dalai Lama was warmly received on a
visit     to Taiwan, whose Guomindang party-government, like its communist rival
in Beijing, persists in the view that Tibet is legally and legitimately part of China.
The vast majority of the population of the secular Mongolian state is
nominally adherents of Tibetan Lamaism Buddhism, whose leader is the Dalai
Lama. In 1979, the Dalai Lama visited the then Marxist state of Mongolia, a
Soviet satellite. Since then, the elevated seat on which he sat continues to be
unoccupied in the Gandan monastery—an institution in Ulaan Baatar that has
long been the center of Lamaist Buddhism in Mongolia. Plans were made for the
Dalai Lama to visit again.
The intensely political issue of Tibet’s future continues to be hotly con-
tested around the world. A security-conscious independent Mongolia must
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take care not to be drawn into a political thicket which it may not fully under-
stand; which would present it with little room for effective maneuver; and in
which there would be high potential for making calamitous errors. If it becomes
too closely wedded to the Dalai Lama’s political agenda, dressed up as a reli-
gion-cultural platform, then independent Mongolia may someday find itself truly
imperiled by China. Mongolia will risk catastrophe if it tries to play “Pakistan” to
China’s “Kashmir in Tibet”. If weak, vulnerable Mongolia seeks to play a Wash-
ington or Hollywood card over the issue of Tibet, carrying favor with elements
in the United States who are sympathetic to the Dalai Lama and his cause, Ulaan
Baatar will discover that it had gained little more than rhetorical support from its
“American friends” in the face of a vengeful and covetous China.
Just as there are policies that Mongolia should avoid, there are paths the
country can take in order to increase its value to its neighbors without stirring
their anxieties. Apropos of this, it is well to recall the case of Switzerland, whose
traditions of passivity in foreign policy and strict adherence to neutrality made
its independence sufficiently valuable to both the Allied and the Axis Powers
during World War II so that its sovereignty was never seriously threatened.
Mongolia has an opportunity to make it useful to both China and Russia. As
long as each of those neighbors does not appear to threaten Mongolia’s inde-
pendence, there is little reason for the other to become alarmed. And in the spirit
of Finland, which pursued a live-and-let-live policy vies-a-vis the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, Mongolia should eschew giving unneeded offense to
either China or Russia.
At a deeper level, it should be recognized that potential coercive diplo-
macy by its two giant neighbors is not the only, or even the greatest, threat to
the security and well-being of Mongolians. Far more critical to most Mongo-
lians are the dangers posed by poverty, deteriorating health and educational
facilities, and environmental pollution. In the years ahead, these conditions are
likely to pose far greater and more certain threats to Mongolians than that of
foreign coercion or military intervention. In the event, Mongolia has brighter
prospects for meeting those threats than others which involve military security.
A welcome climate for direct foreign investment and the transparent privatization
of state enterprises hold out the hope of sustainable economic growth and
development. The exploitation of key raw materials-oil, coal, and tungsten-by
investors requires investment in infrastructure that may in large part be financed
from foreign corporate sources. Such an influx of investment in extractive indus-
tries and other potentially beneficial sectors such as eco-tourism and hunting,
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the processing of cashmere and wools, and even the export of meat products,
will gradually integrate Mongolia into the global economy, with all the benefits
and costs which may derive from globalization.
Critically, Mongolia’s economic development increases the value of its
independence to both China and Russia. Foreign investment in Mongolia will
generate joint ventures with a variety of foreign firms, including Chinese and
Russian enterprises.
Mongolian petroleum can help fuel China’s economic growth, and Mon-
golian beef, lamb, and dairy products can play a key role in feeding China’s
increasingly prosperous urban population. Mongolia, in turn, will benefit from
that prosperity as Chinese(and Russian) investment and tourism grow.
Friends and Partners, Not Allies
It was pointed out above that if Mongolia had strong allies, its indepen-
dence might be imperiled by the fears and suspicions that such allies would
arouse among Mongolia’s powerful neighbors. The answer to Mongolia’s inse-
curity, then, lies not in its having allies, but rather, friends and partners. An ally
is a state that provides or promises to provide military assistance in the event of
war. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is probably the best known
among a series of alliances formed by the United States as part of a policy of
“‘containing” the Soviet Union and its Warsaw-Pact allies. With the Cold War
over, NATO has become an alliance without an adversary and is developing a
new mission that centers on maintaining political stability at Europe’s peripher-
ies.
The NATO experience is especially instructive, underlining as it does that
alliances are formed against an adversary and or adversaries. NATO was estab-
lished to counter a perceived Soviet threat. When that threat was finally lifted,
NATO’s mission became unclear. However defensive the purposes of an alli-
ance, non-members will inevitably perceive it as a potential threat to their secu-
rity. Thus, early in the post-Cold War era Russia continues to be suspicious of
NATO’s eastward expansion and would probably react negatively were the
NATO alliance enlarged still further to include the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia.
In contrast to “allies”, friends and partners are not united by opposition to
or fear of third parties. Instead, friendship and partnership has to do with bonds
of sentiment and perceptions of a broad range of common interests. The “spe-
cial relationship” between the United States and Great Britain is less an alliance
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than a friendship, and NATO was not necessary to assure that each country
would assist the other when asked to help. Anglo-American friendship is ce-
mented by a long history of good will, cooperation and empathy, a common
language and cultural heritage, and a high level of exchanges ranging from trade
and tourism to marriage and education.
Friends need not provide each other with military assistance when a threat
looms. However, they may provide potential or actual victims with political and
economic leverage that is even more valuable. As a case in point, the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, and Korea are in no position to provide military
aid to a beleaguered or endangered Mongolia. They are, however, in a position
to impose steep costs on a country that may contemplate or commit aggression
against Mongolia, e.g., China or Russia.
As noted earlier, Mongolia is presently of little importance to Beijing.
China has far greater interest in, among other things, acquiring foreign invest-
ment, technology and markets          and     membership     in     the     World     Trade
Organization (WTO). Moreover, as China becomes a stronger and more mature
military and economic power, it will seek international recognition of and respect
for that attainment in commensurate political and diplomatic status. In a word,
China will want to join the most exclusive “club” in global politics, one whose
members are the world’s most advanced and highly globalize countries. Were
China to bully or attack a friend or partner, e.g., Mongolia, of the leading mem-
bers of the club, it would invite a reduction or cessation of trade and other
exchanges and would find itself excluded from the club, shunned by its mem-
bers, and treated as a pariah. China would be made to pay a high price for its
actions, costs that would likely outweigh any potential benefits that might ac-
crue from bullying tactics or outright aggression committed against a weak,
vulnerable neighbor.
At present, Mongolia is only beginning to develop friendships and part-
nerships. To do so with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan- which,
along with China and Russia, are of the greatest importance to Mongolia’s
economic and political development—requires cultivating a role for itself and an
image that will appeal to their publics and elites. Most Mongolians already
recognize what the elements of such an image are — a small non-threatening
country that is seeking to reconstruct itself as an open and democratic society
in the midst of a difficult transition from state socialism to a market economy.
Mongolia can foster this image also by associating with other small countries
that are in the midst of a similar transition, e.g., the Central Asian Muslim states
born out of the Soviet collapse.
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Few Mongolians reside in the United States elsewhere in the West, and
Americans know little about Mongolia. In consequence, most Americans have
not formed a clear image of Mongolia or its people. There are, however, cultural
traits among Mongolians that Americans would find very appealing. As befits a
nomadic people without a Confucian tradition, Mongolians view themselves as
egalitarian, industrious, and individualistic, all traits that Americans believe are
characteristic of themselves. And “democracy” and the “free market”, which
Mongolia has committed itself to develop, are the bases of an American mythol-
ogy about themselves and their history and society.
But understanding the elements of an image is only part of what is re-
quired of Mongolia as it looks to the future. The more difficult task will be for it
to foster public awareness of that image among potential   friends and partners.
That will require Mongolians to learn how their friends’ and partners’ political
systems and societies function. During the years of its alliance with the former
Soviet Union, Mongolians learned that it was sufficient to have strong ties
between communist governments and ruling parties. By contrast, friendships
and partnerships with the United States and American interests will require
forging ties with individuals and groups in the private sector, that is, the ele-
ments of America’s civic society. As Alexis de Tocqueville, a shrewd French
observer of American politics and society, recognized over a century and a half
ago, pluralism and civic virtue are the pillars of America’s democracy. Tocqueville
laid the basis for our understanding that the path to political influence upon the
U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch runs through the offices of America’s
corporate and religious leaders, local officials, and even tourist agents. They are
the “opinion leaders” whose positive perception of Mongolia is likely to influ-
ence official American policy toward Mongolia, whose sentiments are worth
more to Mongolia than even large numbers of troops6.
Conclusion
Traditional foreign-policy options based on balance of power and alli-
ances of expediency are not available to independent Mongolia to provide for
its security vis-à-vis its two powerful neighbors, China and Russia. Although
Mongolia’s difficult location distinguishes it from most other states, it should
be emphasized that the declining utility of force to assure national security is a
fact of life facing many countries. In these days, the autonomy, integrity, and
security of most states is threatened far more by the prospect of fragmentation
brought on by ethnic or religious strife within and by the difficulties associated
with efforts to resist external economic and cultural pressures than by the threat
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or fact of old-fashioned military invasion. Indeed, it may be that Mongolia is less
threatened, than most countries because of its ethnic and cultural homogeneity
and, thus far at least, its relatively greater insulation in the economic and cultural
spheres from negative penetration by external forces.
The incidence of foreign invasion has declined sharply in recent decades,
as countries discover more subtle and effective ways to influence one another
and as growing popular awareness of and participation in politics make occupa-
tion of one country by another far costlier, politically and economically, than
ever before. Clearly, then, the security of Mongolia and its people is far more
threatened by the country’s general underdevelopment than by its military weak-
ness. And, in the unlikely event that Mongolia is ever bullied by either or both
of its powerful neighbors, then friendships and partnerships established with
other leading countries in the international community in the course of the
economic and political transition from state socialism to an open market society
will be more important to its survival and general well-being than any military
alliance. In sum, Mongolia can work best to ensure a bright future by getting on
with the tasks of political, economic, and social development7.
FOOTNOTES
1.    Although   Russia’s   military   forces      have   deteriorated significantly
in the post Cold War era, this is probably a temporary   condition^ It should be
noted, too, that even in its weakened state, Russia retains the second most
powerful nuclear arsenal in the world.
2.   See, for example, Peter Duus,    The Abacus and Sword: The Japanese
Penetration of Korea (Berkeley, CA: University    of California   Press,    1995). A
similarly futile   effort to achieve national security vis-à-vis threatening neigh-
bors can be seen in the case of Poland - in its interface with Germany and the
Soviet Union in the interwar years. See, for example, Jan Karski, The Great Pow-
ers and Poland: 1919-1945, From Versailles to Yalta(Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1985).
3.  ironically, were Mongolia able to defend itself against its neighbors, it
would also appear as a threat to those neighbors. A good example is Israel in the
midst of the Arab world.
4.   In the years leading up to World War I, independent  Serbia was   a
magnet   for Slavic   inhabitants of the polyglot Austria-Hungarian   Empire; the
assassination of the Habsburg heir   in Sarajevo   in 1914 by a Bosnian patriot
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who received assistance from Serbian authorities was the pretext for Austria-
Hungary’s declaration   of war against Serbia. Following   the war, Serbia became
the core of a new state, Yugoslavia, based principally on the South Slavs in
Balkan Europe. Piedmont played a similar role in the middle of the nineteenth
century for Italians who sought to unify their country.
5.  No mention was made of a Greater Mongolia irredentism, i.e., of combin-
ing Inner Mongolia with independent Mongolia to form an even larger Mongo-
lian state between China and Russia.
6.   In this regard, we should recall Stalin, whose   dismissal   of papal
influence with the rhetorical   question     “How many [military] divisions has the
Pope got?” revealed a frightful ignorance   of the power of ideas in global
politics. Conclusive evidence of the myopia reflected in Stalin’s remark was
provided years later when papal support was crucial in assisting the Poles to
bring an end to communist control of their country. Mongolia can learn much
from the experience of the People’s Republic of China, which    in recent years
has come to rely heavily on the American business and banking   communities,
especially    their    foreign-investment    and    international-trade sectors, to
champion Chinese economic interests in the corridors of power in the United
States.
7. On the importance of giving priority to development in Mongolia, see
Henry G.Schwarz, “The Security of Mongolia”, Mongolian Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, no.3 (1996), p.87
